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We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments 
concerning three  extensive form games  with  similar perfect equilibria.  In only 
two of the games does observed  behavior approach  the perfect equilibrium as 
players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess 
some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The 
intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior 
in all three games,  even though  the models considered differ in their very long 
term predictions. We argue that for predicting observed behavior the intermediate 
term predictions of dynamic learning models may be even more important than 
their asymptotic properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Num- 
bers: C7, C92.  © 1995 Academic  Press. Inc. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
No  one  can  look  widely  at  experimental  data  without  noticing  that 
experience  matters.  At  least  for  the  first  few  times  a  game  is  played, 
observed behavior is likely to change as players acquire experience,  in a 
way that suggests that learning is important--learning  not only about the 
structure  of the game  being played,  but also about the  behavior of the 
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other players.  (This  is an  observation that  can be made with field data 
also, a  point to which we will return  in the conclusion.) So it is natural 
to consider how well we can explain observed behavior in terms of adapta- 
tion.  And, while adaptative behavior may potentially be quite complex, 
it is useful to see how much of what we observe can be explained with 
very simple models of adaptation. 
This paper considers the behavior observed in experiments with three 
different two-stage sequential  games; a  public goods provision game,  a 
market  game,  and  an  "ultimatum"  bargaining  game,  which  will  all  be 
described shortly. The three games have in common not only a two-stage, 
alternating move structure, but also that the perfect equilibrium prediction 
for each game is that all or almost all of the gains will be captured by one 
player. However, the observed behavior for the three games is different. 
For the  public goods and  market  games,  under  a  variety of conditions 
involving different subject pools and different information about payoffs, 
behavior is observed to converge quickly to the perfect equilibrium predic- 
tion. But in the ultimatum game, also under a variety of conditions, behav- 
ior is observed to be far from the perfect equilibrium prediction even after 
players have gained a reasonable amount of experience. Furthermore, the 
behavior observed in the ultimatum game is different in different subject 
pools, and appears to become more different as the players acquire expe- 
rience. 
We  consider  adaptive  models  from  a  simple  family  of dynamics,  in 
which players increase the probability of playing pure strategies that have 
met with success in previous periods. These simple dynamics do a surpris- 
ingly good job of reproducing the major features of the experimental data. 
Each  dynamic  we  consider  from  this  family  converges  quickly  to  the 
perfect equilibrium  of the public goods and  market games, from a  wide 
range of initial conditions. However these same dynamics do not converge 
quickly, if at all,  to the perfect equilibrium of the ultimatum game,  and 
their behavior in the ultimatum game is sensitive to the initial conditions. 
In  fact,  when  we  initiate  each  of the  dynamics  with  initial  conditions 
estimated from those observed experimentally in different subject pools, 
we see the dynamic paths diverge in much the same way as the ultimatum 
game data. 
One lesson we will seek to draw, therefore, concerns differences among 
the  games,  captured  by the  fact  that  the  same  dynamic  models  make 
different predictions for the different games.  Both the experimental  and 
computational results we report support the intuition that we can expect 
to find classes of games in which certain kinds of equilibrium are quickly 
observed, and others in which they are not. And some games are relatively 
insensitive to initial conditions, while in other games initial conditions are 
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A second lesson concerns which aspects of dynamic models offer testa- 
ble predictions.  While almost all of the theoretical literature on adaptive 
dynamics has focused on the very long term, via theorems about conver- 
gence as time goes to infinity, we will argue that intermediate term results 
(such as paths, velocities, and transit durations) may be even more impor- 
tant. To make this argument, we will consider particular dynamic models 
with quite different long term propertiesmmodels whose asymptotic pre- 
dictions approach perfect equilibria, imperfect equilibria, and non-equilib- 
ria-and observe that these models nevertheless make similar intermedi- 
ate  term  predictions  for  these  three  games.  We  will  argue  that,  both 
because it would be difficult to distinguish among these different dynamics 
on the basis of data,  and because dynamic models are more likely to be 
informative when the learning curve is steep than when it is flat, there is 
reason to pay attention to their intermediate term predictions.  (Although 
we will  not try  to precisely define what  constitutes  the  "intermediate" 
term,  our  operational  definition  will  be  to  take  the  intermediate  term 
predictions of a model to be those it makes as the learning curve begins 
to be very flat.) 
To use an analogy, even if we believe that time and the tide eventually 
turn  all  coastlines  into  sandy  beaches,  knowing the  difference between 
granite and sandstone is a great help in understanding why, in the interme- 
diate term,  some coastlines have rocky cliffs. 
To  summarize,  this  paper  makes  several  kinds  of comparisons.  We 
demonstrate differences among the games by looking at a single dynamic 
model (at  a  time)  and  observing that  it acts differently on the  different 
games. And we demonstrate which aspects of the dynamic models seem 
to us to be potentially most descriptive of observed behavior,  and  most 
testable, by looking at the predictions of several dynamic models simulta- 
neously, and comparing them to each other and to the experimental data. 
We will  see that  the intermediate  term predictions  of all  the models we 
consider are similar both to each other and to the experimental data, even 
though  the long term predictions  of these models can be quite different 
(both from each other and from the experimental data). 
This paper will be organized as follows. Section II presents the experi- 
mental games and observed outcomes. Section III introduces the family 
of dynamic  models we consider.  Section  IV presents  the details  of the 
computational models of the games--it explains how and why we repre- 
sent  the  strategy  spaces  in  the  three  games  by smaller  sets  than  were 
actually  available in the experiments.  Section V  studies  the differences 
among  the  three  games  by comparing  the  dynamics  they induce  when 
the  initial  conditions  are  randomly  generated.  Section  VI  presents  the 
predictions of these dynamic models about the experimental games, start- 
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other and with the experimental data. Section VII concludes with a sum- 
mary  of what  we  think  we  have  learned,  some  directions for further 
work, and some final reflections on intermediate term versus long term 
predictions. 
II.  EXPERIMENTAL  DATA 
The data we consider come from two papers:  Roth et al.  (1991);  and 
Prasnikar and Roth (1992). The first of those papers compares the behavior 
observed  in  a  two-player ultimatum bargaining game and  a  ten-player 
market game (of the  "one right  shoe,  nine left shoes" variety) played 
under comparable conditions in four countries.~ The games and the envi- 
ronment in which they were played are described as follows (Roth et al. 
(1991) pp.  1068-1169): 
The two-player bargaining environment we look at is an ultimatum game: 
one bargainer makes a proposal of how to divide a certain sum of money with 
another bargainer, who has the opportunity to accept or reject the proposed 
division.  If the  second bargainer accepts,  each bargainer earns the amount 
proposed for him by the first bargainer, and if the second bargainer rejects, 
then each bargainer earns zero. To allow us to observe the effects of experience, 
subjects in the bargaining part of the experiment each participate in ten bargain- 
ing sessions against different opponents. Although different pairs of bargainers 
interact simultaneously, each bargainer learns only the result of his own negoti- 
ation. 
The multi-player market environment we examine has a  similar structure: 
multiple buyers (nine, in most sessions) each submit an offer to a single seller 
to buy an indivisible object worth the same amount to each buyer (and nothing 
to the seller). The  seller has the opportunity to accept or reject the highest 
price offered. If the seller accepts then the seller earns the highest price offered, 
the buyer who made the highest offer (or, in case of ties, a buyer selected by 
lottery from among those who made the highest offer) receives the difference 
between the object's value and the price he offered, and all other buyers receive 
zero.  If the  seller rejects,  then all players  receive zero.  Each player learns 
whether a  transaction took place, and at what price. To allow us to observe 
the effects of experience, subjects in the market part of the experiment each 
participate in ten markets, with a changing population of buyers. 
i These were Israel, Japan, Slovenia (when it was still part of Yugoslavia), and the U.S.A. 
Ultimatum game experiments have been reported by Guth et al. (1982),  and by many others 
since, along with sequential bargaining games having more periods (inspired in part by the 
theoretical work of Stahl,  1972,  and Rubinstein,  1982, on multiperiod games).  Both in the 
one-period ultimatum games and in the longer bargaining games, experimental results typi- 
cally diverge from the perfect equilibrium predictions (see, e.g., Ochs and Roth,  1989,  or 
Bolton, 1991, or see Roth,  1994, for a survey of such bargaining experiments). "Right shoe 
left shoe" games have been a source of theoretical examples for a long time; some earlier 
experimental results are reported in Murnighan and Roth (1980). 168  ROTH  AND  EREV 
In both the market and bargaining environment, the prediction of the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium (under the auxiliary assumption that subjects seek 
to  maximize their monetary  payoffs)  is  that one  player  will  receive  all  the 
wealth (or almost all, if payoffs are discrete). 
We  note  in  passing  that  many  interesting  problems  of experimental 
design arise in conducting an experiment in four countries, if one wishes 
to control for the fact that the data are collected by different experimenters, 
and  subjects are  instructed  in  different  languages  and  paid  in  different 
currencies. We refer the reader to Roth et al. (1991) for how these problems 
were addressed. 2 For our present purposes, it is enough to note that the 
experiment gives us data about each game from subjects who played the 
game  10 times,  but against different opponents each time (in order that 
the one-shot character of each game be preserved). Thus subjects gained 
experience  with  the  game  at  the  same  time  as  they encountered  other 
subjects who had gained a similar amount of experience. (Subjects played 
the  same  role  in  all  rounds--e.g.,  a  subject who was a  player  I  in  the 
ultimatum game would be a player  1 in all  10 rounds.) 
All  transactions  were  carried  out  in  terms  of "1000  tokens"  with  a 
smallest divisible unit of 5 tokens.  Note the similarity in the equilibrium 
structure of the two games. At the perfect equilibria of both the ultimatum 
and market games, one player's payoff is either 995 or 1000; in the market 
game the perfect equilibrium offers are 995 or 1000, and in the ultimatum 
game these are the perfect equilibrium demands (for himself) by the pro- 
poser.  But for both games any offer can be made at a  nonperfect Nash 
equilibrium.  Nevertheless,  the  behavior  observed  in  the  two games  is 
different; quickly approaching perfect equilibrium in the market game in all 
four countries, and remaining far from perfect equilibrium in the ultimatum 
game. 3 
In the market game, offers made in round 1 were dispersed, but equilib- 
rium was reached in all four countries by round  I0, with from almost 40% 
to over 70% of all offers being at the highest feasible prices in the different 
subject pools. (Note that perfect equilibrium is achieved in a given market 
whenever two or more offers of 1000 are made,  so that  no prediction is 
made about the dispersal of lower offers.) 
2 We emphasize that the details of how experiments are conducted are often of critical 
importance in  understanding the  results.  We  skip  over many details  so  lightly here  not 
merely  because  they are  published elsewhere,  but  because they are  important primarily 
for evaluating the differences observed between  subject pools.  We are  content to  leave 
unexplained here those differences observed in the first periods of play, and we will show 
that the remaining differences can largely be explained via the adaptive models we consider. 
3 To conserve space,  we must content ourselves below with a  verbal description of the 
data, which are described much more completely, of course,  in the original papers.  Later 
in the paper we will offer more formal comparisons of the learning simulations and the data 
from these experiments (see, e.g., the first (data) columns of Figs. 4-6). LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA AND  MODELS  169 
The  ultimatum  game  data tell  a  very different  story.  In round  1,  the 
same modal demand, of 500, was observed in each country. But in round 
10, the modal demands were still 500 in the U.S. and Slovenia, while in 
Japan there were modes at 550 and 600, and in Israel there was a  mode 
at 600.  These  differences in the  modes reflect significant  differences in 
the distributions  of observed demands. 4 That  is, unlike what we saw in 
the market game, tenth round demands in the ultimatum game did not begin 
to approach the perfect equilibrium, and there were significant differences 
among the subject pools. 
The  paper  by  Prasnikar  and  Roth  compared  ultimatum  and  market 
games with a third game called a  "best shot" game. The best shot game 
is a  two-player game whose rules are that player 1 states a quantity ql, 
after which player 2, informed of q j, states a quantity q2- An amount of 
public good equal to the maximum  of qj and q2 (the "best shot") results, 
and  each player i receives a  payoff which  is  a function of that  quantity 
of public good (q =  max{ql, q2}) minus $0.82 times qi (see Table I). The 
perfect  equilibrium  prediction  is  that  player  1 will  choose  q~  =  0  and 
player 2 will choose q2  =  4, giving player  1 a profit of $3.70 and player 
2 a $0.42 profit. 5 Prasnikar and Roth (1992)  observed these games under 
two  information  conditions.  Subjects  in  the  full  information  condition 
knew that both players had the same payoff table (Table I), while subjects 
in  the  partial  information  condition  knew only that  Table I  determined 
their  own payoffs--they did  not  know  how the  other  player's  payoffs 
were determined.  As  in the ultimatum  and  market  games,  each  subject 
participated in ten one-shot games against different opponents, always in 
the same position (player 1 or player 2). 6 In both information conditions 
the players learned quickly not to both provide positive quantities.  In the 
full information condition (but not the partial information condition) every 
4 The observed distributions are significantly different for every pair of countries except 
the U.S.A. and Slovenia, and the between country differences are larger than the differences 
between groups within a given country. (Because the distributions are highly asymmetric, 
the statistical test used is the Mann-Whitney U  test, which is based on the rank of each 
observation in the sample distribution.) 
5 Thus the ratio of predicted payoffs to the two players is nine to one. To see that (ql = 
0, q2 =  4) is the unique perfect equilibrium outcome, observe from Table I that if player l 
provides ql  =  0, then player 2's unique best response is to provide q2  =  4,  since the first 
four  units of public good  all  have a  higher marginal value than the  cost  to  player 2  of 
providing each unit, while the fifth unit of public good has a lower marginal value. And if 
player  1 provides a  quantity ql  ->  l,  then player 2's unique best response is to provide 
q2  =  0,  which gives  player  l  a  strictly lower payoff than if he provides 0  and player 2 
provides 4.  Note there is one other outcome, ql  =  4, q2  =  0,  which can occur at a Nash 
equilibrium (but not at a perfect equilibrium). 
6 Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989)  had earlier reported experimental results for the best 
shot game under the partial information condition, similar to those discussed here. 170  ROTH  AND  EREV 
TABLE I 
REDEMPTION VALUES AND EXPENDITURE VALUES FOR THE BEST SHOT FULL 
AND PARTIAL INFORMATION GAMES 
Redemption  values  Expenditure  values 
Redemption  Number of  Cost  to you of the 
Project  level  value of  Total  redemption  units you  number units you 
(units of q)  specific units  value of all units  provide  provide 
0  $0.00  $0.00  0  $0.00 
1  1,00  1.00  I  0.82 
2  0,95  1.95  2  1.64 
3  0.90  2.85  3  2.46 
4  0.85  3.70  4  3.28 
5  0.80  4.50  5  4.10 
6  0,75  5.25  6  4.92 
7  0,70  5.95  7  5.74 
8  0,65  6.60  8  6.56 
9  0.60  7.20  9  7.38 
10  0,55  7.75  10  8.20 
11  0,50  8.25  I 1  9.02 
12  0,45  8.70  12  9.84 
13  0.40  9.10  13  10.66 
14  0.35  9.45  14  11.48 
15  0.30  9.75  15  12.30 
16  0.25  10.00  16  13.12 
17  0.20  10.25  17  13.94 
18  0.15  10.35  18  14.76 
19  0.10  10.45  19  15.58 
20  0.05  10.50  20  16.40 
21  0.00  10.50  21  21.22 
player 1 learned (before round 10) to provide q l = 0. And in both conditions 
the perfect equilibrium outcome (q~, q2) =  (0, 4) was the modal outcome 
by round  10,  although convergence  towards the perfect equilibrium was 
faster  in  the  full  information  condition  than  in  the  partial  information 
condition. 
Thus all of these three games have extreme perfect equilibrium predic- 
tions, and the experimental results (nevertheless) show quick convergence 
to the perfect equilibrium in the market game and best shot game in the 
full information condition, somewhat slower convergence in the best shot 
game with partial information, and no apparent approach to perfect equilib- 
rium at all in the ultimatum game.  We turn next to see what insight into 
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III.  A  FAMILY  OF ADAPTIVE  MODELS 
We describe here a family of stochastic dynamic models of individual 
behavior, which determine the probability that a given player will choose 
a given pure strategy at time t, and how these probabilities evolve over 
time in response to the player's experience. We defer to Sections V and 
VI the descriptions of the multiplayer interactions  in the computational 
simulations. 
Our  selection of dynamic  models has  been guided  by three  principle 
criteria.  First, the models should be consistent with the robust properties 
of learning  observed in the large experimental  psychology literature  on 
both human and animal learning. Perhaps the most robust of these proper- 
ties is that choices that  have led to good outcomes in the past are more 
likely to be repeated in the future.  (This result,  known as the  "Law of 
Effect,"  has  been  observed  in  a  very wide variety  of environments  at 
least since Thorndike,  1898.) Another robust observation is that learning 
curves  tend  to  be  steep  initially,  and  then  flatter.  (This  observation is 
known as the "Power Law of Practice," and dates back at least to Black- 
burn,  1936. 7  ) 
The second criterion is that the model of how an individual changes his 
behavior in response to his experience should not depend on observations 
that cannot be made by the players in the experimental environments  in 
question.  In particularl  in each game we consider there are information 
sets not reached on any given play of the game, so players cannot observe 
one another's strategies, only their choices. For example in the ultimatum 
game,  if a  player observes that  a  certain  offer was rejected,  he cannot 
observe which offers would have been accepted, and vice versa. 8 
The third criterion is that the models should not depend on observations 
about the players that cannot be observed in the experimental data. While 
the experimental data we consider reveal more than can be observed by 
7 A  typical expression of this "power law,"  from which it derives its name, is that the 
relationship between the time T it takes to perform a task, as a function of how many times 
P  it has been practiced, often fits well a curve of the form T =  aP  -b for constants a and b, 
so that the decrease in time corresponding to increased practice quickly becomes small. 
s This rules out dynamic models such as "fictitious play," in which players observe each 
other's full pure strategies.  Robinson (1951)  showed that fictitious play converges to the 
Nash equilibrium for two-player zero sum games, and Shapley (1964) showed a non-conver- 
gent two-person nonzero-sum counterexample.  Recently there has been renewed interest 
in convergence results for this and related dynamic models: see, e.g., Aoyagi (1992), Fuden- 
berg and  Kreps  (1993),  Krishna (1992),  Milgrom and Roberts (1991),  and  Monderer and 
Shapley (1992). There has also been some recent theoretical interest in notions of equilibrium 
which arise when players cannot observe each other's strategies, but only their behavior 
at information sets which are reached: see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1993a,b) and Kalai 
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any individual player in the experiment (e.g., about distributions of  choices 
across  the  population of players) the  data do  not  reveal  what players 
initially believe, or how they update their beliefs. We have chosen not to 
construct models with unobservable parameters for each individual.  9 
An  additional criterion,  harder  to  make  precise,  is  that  the  models 
should be simple. The models we consider here will all be variations on 
the following basic model, which can be applied to games with finite pure 
strategy sets. 
A.  The Basic  Model 
At time t =  1 (before any experience has been acquired) each player n 
has  an  initial propensity to  play his  kth  pure  strategy, given by  some 
number q,,~(l). If player n plays his kth pure strategy at time t and receives 
a payoff of x, then the propensity to play strategy k is updated by setting 
q,x(t  +  I)  =  q,,k(t)  +  x,  while for all other pure strategies j, q,,i(t  +  1)  = 
q,o(t).  The probability p,,~(t)  that player n  plays his kth pure  strategy at 
time t  is p,,k(t)  =  q,,k(t)/Eq,,j(t),  where the  sum is  over all  of player n's 
pure strategies j. 
So pure strategies which have been played and have met with success 
tend over time to be played with greater frequency than those which have 
met with less success; i.e. these dynamics obey the "law of effect." Also, 
the learning curve will be steeper in early periods and flatter later (because 
Eq,j(t) is an increasing function of t, so a payoff of x from playing pure 
strategy k at time t has a bigger effect on p,,k(t)  when t is small than when 
t  is  large; i.e.,  the derivative of pnk(t)  will  respect to a  payoff of x  is  a 
decreasing function of t). This latter property will permit our loose opera- 
tional definition for the  "intermediate term"-- as the steep part of the 
learning curve gives way to  the  flat part,  the  short term ends  and the 
intermediate term begins. 
These learning dynamics have a  certain resemblance to evolutionary 
dynamics (cf. Maynard Smith, 1982) even though they are not the "replica- 
tor" dynamics customarily associated with evolutionary models, l0 (In fact 
9 That is not to say of course that such beliefs may not play a role, even an essential role, 
in players' behavior. There have recently been a  number of interesting Bayesian models 
which explore  long term convergence to  Nash  equilibria (e.g.,  Jordan,  1991;  Kalai  and 
Lehrer,  1993; and N yarko,  1992). Of particular interest is Crawford (1992),  which estimates 
belief parameters for agents from the experimental data of Van Huyck et al.  (1990,  1991) 
and uses these estimates to run simulations of their experiments which agree well with the 
experimental observations. We discuss in the conclusion how players' knowledge and beliefs 
might be influencing their behavior in the data we consider, despite the good results we get 
from models which ignore these factors. 
to See e.g.  Friedman (1991)  for a  discussion of a  broad class of evolutionary dynamics 
characterized by the fact that successful strategies increase their share of the population. 
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this  model was proposed as an approximation of evolutionary dynamics 
by Harley, 1981). The chief point of similarity is that the influence of other 
players' past behavior on any player n's behavior at time t is via the effect 
that their behavior has had on player n's past payoffs. 
This  model is also quite similar to that  of Bush and  Mosteller (1955) 
(which was employed by Cross,  1983 to explain economic behavior), but 
it has some significant differences. Bush and Mosteller's model also obeys 
the law of effect, but, unlike the model we consider, their learning curves 
need not get flatter over time.~t 
The simple model we consider does not require (or permit) a player to 
observe the full strategies of other players, or to make calculations based 
on other players' payoffs. So it can be applied to the kinds of games we 
consider here in which players only observe one another's  choices, not 
their strategies.  And it can be applied to the best shot games under both 
full and partial  information. 
B.  Some Modifications 
Here we introduce three modifications of the basic model. The first has 
a  "cutoff" parameter/z  which prevents events with unobservably small 
probabilities from influencing the outcome. The second modification has 
an "experimentation" (or "error" or "generalization") parameter e which 
prevents the probability of a  strategy from going to zero if it is "close" 
to a successful strategy. The third modification introduces a "forgetting" 
parameter ~, which speeds convergence by preventing the sum of  any player 
n's propensities, Eq,,j(t), from growing without bound as t goes to infinity. 
When/x, e, and ~ all equal zero, we have the basic model described above. 
noninherited characteristics might play in learning in economic environments. Evolutionary 
models  have been  compared  with experimental data  by Crawford (1991) (for a  series of 
coordination experiments the first  of which is reported by Van Huyck et al.  (1990)),  and 
by Miller and Andreoni (1991)  who considered the stylized facts from a number of public 
goods experiments. Another, more complex kind of biologically motivated model is that of 
"genetic algorithms" (Holland,  1975), which involve mating as well as selection. (See also 
Holland and Miller,  1991, for some further thoughts on using genetic algorithms to model 
economic behavior.) Arthur (1991,  1993) uses some individual choice data reported by Bush 
and Mosteller (1955) to calibrate a model very closely related to the basic model considered 
here  (except that  the  rate  of learning  is  kept  constant  by  renormalizing the  sum  of the 
propensities after each choice), and reports a good fit with the learning behavior reported 
in that experiment. 
11 Bush and Mosteller's model updates the probabilities of choosing each strategy directly, 
without the intermediate "propensities" we employ. This has the effect (which Bush and 
Mosteller,  1955 p.  17,  refer to as  "Independence-of-path")  of making the magnitude of 
change in any period dependent only on the current probabilities and not on the amount of 
previous experience. Their model also differs from the one we consider here in that it cannot 
converge to a pure strategy in an uncertain environment in which the post-hoc best response 
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1.  Extinction  in Finite  Time 
The first modification allows the probabilities pnk(t) to go to zero in finite 
time. We do this by simply truncating to zero probabilities which fall below 
some small "cutoff" probability/z. That is, whenever in the basic model 
we get phi(t)  =  q,,k(t)/Y,q,,j(t)  <  /~, we set p,,k(t)  =  q,,k(t)  =  0 instead. This 
has several advantages and some (potential) disadvantages. Not least of the 
advantages is that it allows us to avoid predicting that the long term behavior 
of the game depends on (intermediate term) events of such low probability 
that they would have virtually no chance of being observed in the data. It 
is good to avoid basing predictions on unobservables, when you can. (This 
also has the practical advantage of  preventing roundofferror from becoming 
a factor in the computational results.) A second advantage is that setting 
these small probabilities to zero speeds convergence, which can now take 
place in finite time. Since our argument about the relative merits of interme- 
diate term as opposed to long term results will apply even to the speeded 
up model, this increases the force of the argument. 
Among the potential disadvantages of allowing finite extinction in this 
way is that it may add unwanted variance--there is even a positive proba- 
bility that a strictly inferior strategy will persist while superior strategies 
become extinct.  Suppose for example  that  a  player happens  to  play a 
strictly dominated strategy that nevertheless yields a small positive payoff. 
Since this payoff increases his propensity to play this strategy, there is a 
chance that he will play it again, and again, and a sufficiently long sequence 
of plays in which he employs only this strategy could result in its probabil- 
ity  coming  sufficiently  close  to  one  so  that  all  other  strategies  would 
become extinct. This cannot happen in the next modification of the basic 
model, which introduces persistent  local experimentation. 
2.  Persistent  Local Experimentation  or Error 
The modification we consider now will not employ a cutoff probability 
(i.e.,  p~  =  0  in  this  model),  but  neither  will  it  allow the  probability  of 
playing a  strategy to become arbitrarily  close to zero if that  strategy is 
"close" to a high probability strategy. In particular, we introduce a param- 
eter e which, when it is positive, can be interpreted as guaranteeing persis- 
tent  local  experimentation  or error. ~z We do this  by changing  the  way 
each player updates the propensities to play each pure strategy. If player 
n A much more nuanced model of persistent experimentation in extensive form games is 
given by Fudenberg and Kreps (1988).  Kandori et al. (1993) explore an evolutionary model 
in which persistent experimentation (or mutation, or entry) produces a  stationary Markov 
process with a positive probability of transiting in one step from any state to any other. For 
related  work  see  Foster and  Young  (1990),  Young  0993),  and  Binmore and  Samuelson 
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n plays his kth pure strategy at time t and receives a payoff  of x, then the 
propensity to play strategy k is updated by setting q,k(t +  1)  =  q,k(t)  + 
(1  -  e)x. The remaining quantity ex will be added to the propensities to 
play the strategies adjacent to strategy k, where "adjacent" remains to 
be precisely defined in Section IV when we describe the simplified games 
on which the computations are performed. For all other pure strategies j 
(i.e., for j  neither equal to nor adjacent to k),  q,j(t  +  1)  =  q,j(t).  When 
e  =  0  this  model is  the same as  the basic  model. When e  is  positive, 
there is  persistent  "local" experimentation--strategies close to a  high 
probability strategy must also be played with a positive probability that 
is bounded away from zero.~3 
3.  Gradual Forgetting 
The  final modification we  consider has  a  "forgetting" parameter ~o, 
which  limits  how  flat  the  learning  curve  can  become.  At  the  end  of 
each  period  t,  each  propensity q,o(t)  obtained  as  before  is  multiplied 
by  I  -  ~o, e.g.  if ~o  =  0.001 then each propensity is  multiplied by 0.999 
to  obtain  the  propensities  for the  next period.  (This  has  no  effect on 
the  p,,~,  since  the  ratios  of propensities  are  unchanged,  but  it  keeps 
the sum of the propensities from growing without bound.) When Zq,,j(t) 
is small, this has little effect on player n's rate of learning. But suppose, 
for  example,  that  player  n  earns  an  average  payoff of p  per  round, 
and  that  ~o  =  .001.  Then  Y~q,o(t) will  tend  to  grow  over  time  until  it 
reaches  1000p, after  which  the  amount  gained  per  round  will  just 
equal  the  amount  "forgotten,"  so  that  Zq,o(t)  will  thereafter  remain 
approximately constant (unless player n's average payoff  should change). 
At  that  point  the  "weight  of the  past"  will  stop  growing,  and  each 
new  payoff will  start  to  have  approximately  the  same  influence  on 
player n's  propensities.  This  will  allow  us  to  show  more  clearly how 
the models diverge in the very long term.  For this purpose, we will use 
a positive forgetting parameter together with a positive experimentation 
13 If persistent  global  experimentation  is  desired,  the  residual  propensities  ex  can  be 
distributed over all pure strategies. The choice of local experimentation is motivated in part 
by the observation that feedback which reinforces a  given choice also reinforces similar 
choices (a phenomenon referred to as "generalization" in the behavioral psychology litera- 
ture-see, e.g., Guttman and Kalish, 1956, for an early study of this phenomenon in pigeons). 
Note that when the states of the system are modeled as being the vector of propensities to 
play each pure strategy, the resulting stochastic process is a Markov process with an infinite 
state space,  with nonrecurring states (because every agreement increases the sum of the 
propensities). Thus descriptive simplicity does not insure analytical simplicity. (More gener- 
ally, the initial steps of a project designed to produce models of observed behavior can be 
expected to be different from the initial steps of projects directed at showing how equilibria 
might arise. The two agendas may eventually show signs of convergence .... ) 176  ROTH  AND  EREV 
parameter,  so that we will be considering a  model of local experimenta- 
tion  with  gradual forgetting. 
The  local  experimentation  models  (with  or  without forgetting)  have 
quite  different  long  term  properties  than  the  cutoff  model.  This  is 
easiest  to  see  by  noting that  the  local  experimentation  models  cannot 
converge to pure  strategies  (since  if strategy k  were  to be  played with 
probability  approaching  I  -  e,  the  probabilities  of  strategies  k  -  1 
and k  +  1 would eventually each approach  e/2).  Nevertheless,  we will 
see that the intermediate term predictions  of all three  models are quite 
similar.  The  differences  in  the  models'  long  term  predictions  only 
become  apparent  in  the  ultimatum  game,  and  only  in  the  very  long 
term. 
4.  Parameters of the Models 
Within each  of the  computations which follow, players  on the  same 
side  of a  game  will  have  the  same  initial  propensities,  i.e.,  for  each 
pure  strategy  k,  and  for  any  two  players  n  and  m  on  the  same  side 
of the game q,,k(1) =  qmk(1).  (Of course this equality will not in general 
hold for times  t  >  1,  since  at  time  t  =  1 even  players  with the  same 
initial propensities  will  choose  different strategies,  encounter different 
behavior from their opponents,  etc.) So there are  two kinds of choices 
of initial propensities  which will influence the predictions  of the model 
for subsequent  times  t.  The first of these  are  the  ratios q,k(l)/qnj(1)  of 
propensities  to  play different pure  strategies  k  and j,  which determine 
the relative probabilities  that k and j  will be played at time t  =  1.  The 
second  is  the  sum  over  all  pure  strategies j  of  the  initial  propensi- 
ties,  which  we  call  the  strength  of  the  initial  propensities, 
S(1)  =  2q,i(1). 
When the initial propensities are strong, i.e. when S(1) is high, learning 
will be slower than when S(I) is low. (If player n plays pure strategy k at 
time t  =  1 and earns x, the updated probability that he will play k at t  = 
2 is p,k(2)  =  (q,,~(1) +  (1  -  e)x)/(S(1)  + x).)  In the computations which 
follow, we will report results for initial strengths of 10, the same order of 
magnitude as the payoffs in the games.~4 
t4 We have briefly examined the models studied here with S(1) =  100 also, which produces 
somewhat slower initial learning but does not appear to be different in any other way from 
the parameters we report.  Note that  the cutoff and experimentation parameters can also 
influence the importance of each  player's  initial experience at  time t  =  1.  When S(l)  is 
small, p. is large, and e  =  cp =  0, the experience at t  =  l  has the most chance of influencing 
the long term predictions of the dynamic model, since learning is fast and there is a chance 
for one strategy to drive out all others.  Note  also that  a  model which had both e  and/~ 
positive could behave differently than the local experimentation models we concentrate on, 
and could have one pure strategy played with probability one in the long term (when the 
probability of playing an adjacent strategy might fall below the cutoff even after the addition 
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We  will report  results for the  cutoff model with /~  =  0.01  (and  e  = 
~o =  0), for the local experimentation model with e  --  0.05  and O. 1 (and 
/z  =  ~o  =  0),  and  for  the  experimentation  model  with  forgetting with 
e  =  0.05 and O.1, ~o =  .001, and/z =  O. 
IV.  THE  SIMPLIFIED  GAMES  USED  FOR  COMPUTATIONS 
The  games  played  in  the  experiments  described  earlier  have  finite 
pure  strategy  sets,  and  so,  when  we  prepare  to  run  a  learning  model 
through a  simulation of the experiments, we could in principle estimate 
from the data the initial propensities to play each strategy. The problem 
with this  approach  is  that  it would require  enormous  amounts of data 
to  estimate  reliable  probabilities  for  playing each  of so  many distinct 
strategies.  Instead,  we  simplify  the  games  by  aggregating  the  many 
strategies  into  a  relatively  small  set  of  strategies,  so  that  when  the 
data  are  similarly  aggregated,  we  have  a  chance  of  having  multiple 
observations for each  strategy of the  simplified game. ~5 The games are 
simplified as  follows. 
The Simplified Ultimatum Game.  Players 1 and 2 each have nine pure 
strategies. Player 1 chooses a demand d~, which is an integer between 1 
and 9, and is the amount player 1 demands for himself. Player 2 chooses 
a maximal acceptable demand m2, which is also an integer between 1 and 
9. If player l's demand is acceptable to player 2, i.e., ifd~ -< m2 then player 
1 earns d~ and player 2 earns 10 -  d~. If the demand is not acceptable, i.e. 
if d~  >  m2  then each  player earns  0.  So  dl  and  m2 constitute a  Nash 
equilibrium if and only if d~  =  m2, while the unique perfect equilibrium 
is d I =  m2 =  9. 
The Simplified Best Shot Game.  Player I chooses one of three possible 
contributions q~  =  0, 2 or 4. Player 2 chooses one of 27 response rules: 
000, 002, 004, 020, 022, 024, 040, 042, 044, 
200,  202,  204, 220,  222, 224, 240, 242, 244, 
400, 402, 404,420,  422, 424, 440, 442, 444, 
where the first number in each response rule is the amount q2 that player 
2 will provide in response to a contribution ofq~ = 0, the second a response 
to qj  =  2 and the third a response to q~ =  4. The payoffs are determined, 
as in the experiment, from Table I (e.g., at the perfect equilibrium, when 
15 Note that even though these are all games of perfect recall, strategies and behavioral 
strategies are not equivalent for the adaptive models we are considering. We are modeling 
strategies, not behavioral strategies. 178  ROTH  AND  EREV 
player 1 chooses q~  =  0 and player 2 chooses the response rule 400, the 
payoffs are (3.70, 0.42),  corresponding to the quantities q~  =  0 and q2 = 
4). 
The Simplified Market Game.  Each buyer n chooses one of 11  prices 
from the set {.25,  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 9.75}.  If the price Pn chosen by 
buyer n is strictly higher than the price chosen by any other buyer, then 
buyer n  earns  10  -  p,,  and all the other buyers earn 0.  If the maximum 
price p, is chosen by k buyers, then each one of them earns (I0 -  p,)/k, 
while all the other buyers earn 0. (In this simplified market game we have 
suppressed  the role of the  seller,  who in the data of Roth et al.  (1991) 
never rejected an offer. It will be apparent that we could have included the 
seller, modeled like player 2 in the ultimatum game, without substantively 
changing the results.) 
We can now complete our description of how, when the experimenta- 
tion  parameter  e  is  positive,  the  propensities  to  play  pure  strategies 
are  updated for strategies  "adjacent" to the one most  recently played. 
For the  simplified ultimatum and  market games,  adjacent strategies are 
determined  by  the  usual  order  of  the  real  line.  For  example  in  the 
ultimatum game  if e  =  0.05,  and  players  I  and  2  choose  d t  =  7  and 
m2  =  8,  then  player  1 earns  7,  and  his  propensity  to  choose  7  in  the 
next  period  is  increased  by 0.95  ×  7  =  6.65  while  his  propensities  to 
choose  6  and  8  are  each  increased  by 0.175.  In  the  same  way,  player 
2  earns  3  and  his  propensity  to  choose  8  is  increased  by  0.95  ×  3  = 
2.85,  and  his  propensities  to  choose  7  and  9  are  each  increased  by 
0.075. 
If a player has chosen an extreme strategy, such as 9 in the ultimatum 
game, and earns x, then the propensity to play 8 is increased by (e/2)x as 
before, while the propensity to play 9 is increased by (1  -  e/2)x (instead 
of by  (I  -  e)x  that  would  have  been  allocated  if there  were  a  higher 
adjacent strategy). This "extra" (e/2)x allocated to the extreme strategy 
gives a  slight local upward bias to the dynamics of the ultimatum game 
which we will see is not sufficient to make the ultimatum results approach 
in the intermediate term the perfect equilibrium prediction that player I 
will demand 9.16 
For the best shot game the situation for player I  is exactly analogous 
to the other two games, but if player 2 plays response rule xyz and player 
I has chosen q~, the adjacent response rules are those which agree with xyz 
on those components different from q~. For example if player 1 chooses 
q l =  2 and player 2 chooses response rule 222, then (from Table I) each 
16 If we had chosen instead the option of allocating the extra (el2)x  to strategy 8 in this 
case, it would have produced a  slight downward bias, and it might have appeared that this 
was the cause of the failure to converge to 9. LEARNING IN GAMES: DATA AND MODELS  179 
player receives a payoff of 1.95-1.64  =  0.31,  and player 2's propensity 
to play 222 is increased by (1  -  e)(0.31) while his propensities to play 242 
and 202 are each increased by (e/2)(0.31). 
In  Section  VI  we  will  report  full  simulations  of the  experimental 
environment, starting from observed initial conditions. First, however, 
we  demonstrate  differences  in  the  dynamics  of  these  three  games 
independently of the experimental observations, by considering random 
initial propensities  (rather  than  initial  propensities  estimated from the 
experimental data). 
V.  DYNAMICS OF THE THREE GAMES 
WITH RANDOM INITIAL CONDITIONS 
Here we report the results of simulations of each of the three games, 
starting from initial conditions drawn randomly, from a uniform distribu- 
tion. We will see that the intermediate term behavior of the cutoff and 
the two local experimentation models are very similar, but the three games 
are very different (although the learning curves quickly become flat in all 
three games). The market game simulations converge rapidly and consis- 
tently to the perfect equilibrium. In the best shot game simulations, (except 
in the rare case that player 1 starts out with an initial probability of playing 
the perfect equilibrium that is near the cutoff level) player I quickly learns 
to provide the perfect equilibrium quantity, q l = 0, with high probability, 
while player 2's behavior moves more slowly in the direction of perfect 
equilibrium. In the ultimatum game simulations, the predicted behavior 
using the cutoff model converges both to imperfect equilibria and to non- 
equilibria, typically quite far from the perfect equilibrium, and even the 
simulations using the local experimentation model with forgetting do not 
begin to approach perfect equilibrium until the very long term (i.e., until 
the predicted behavior has lingered for a long time far from the perfect 
equilibrium). 
We begin with the two-player games, i.e., the best-shot and ultimatum 
games.  Each  simulation reported  in this  section is  the result of a  two 
player interaction, repeated for 1000 rounds (and reported for t  =  1 to 
t  =  300,  and  for  t  =  1,000),  starting from initial propensities  chosen 
randomly from a uniform distribution over each player's pure strategies. ~7 
For the ultimatum game we also report results for t  =  10,000,  100,000, 
and  1,000,000  rounds  (which  will  begin  to  allow us  to  distinguish the 
t7 For each player, a "pre-propensity"  for each of his pure strategies is drawn from a 
uniform distribution  of [0,1], and then these are normalized  so that S(I), the strength  of the 
initial propensities, equals 10. 180  ROTH  AND  EREV 
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different long term behavior of the  cutoff and experimentation  models, 
particularly when the forgetting parameter is positive). 
Figure  la shows the results of five simulations of the best shot game 
with the cutoff model (with/x =  0.01). The figure is read vertically, i.e., 
the results of simulation A  are read from the first column, simulation B 
from the  second,  etc.  Each  column  contains  three  graphs,  the  lowest 
corresponding to the choice by player 1 of q m  =  0, the middle to q n =  2, PROBABILITY 
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b 
and the top to q~ =  4. The lines made of dark dots show how the probability 
that player 1 will choose each of these strategies evolved over time. (Note 
that in every round these three probabilities  must sum to  1, i.e., P(q~  = 
O)  +  P(q~  =  2)  +  P(qj  =  4)  =  1.)  In  simulation  A  player  l's  initial 
propensity  to play q~  =  0 is so close to the cutoff that it is extinguished. 
However in each of the other four simulations, the probability that player 
1 chooses q~  =  0 (the perfect equilibrium prediction) quickly approached 
1.  (This  is representative:  See Table II.) 
Player 2's predicted behavior is a little harder to graph,  since player 2 182 
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has  27  pure  strategies.  The  probability  that player 2  will respond  to  a 
given choice of q n with a  choice of q2 =  0, 2, or 4 is shown by the lines 
composed of the corresponding numbers in the graph corresponding to 
each value of ql. (So, for example, the line graphing the probability that 
player 2 will choose q2 =  4 in response to q]  =  0 is the sum over all nine 
of player 2's response rules which produce this result.) In all but simulation 
D, the probability that player 2 will choose q2  =  0 in response to q]  =  0 
quickly becomes small. Player 2 does not learn as fast as player I. There 
are a  number of reasons for this:  (i)  player 2 has many more strategies LEARNING IN GAMES:  DATA AND  MODELS 
TABLE II 
BEST SHOT GAME WITH RANDOM INITIAL PROPENSITIES 
183 
Model 
t  /.~  =  0.01  ~ =  0.05  e  =  0.05,  ~o =  0.001 
Mean  300  0.74  0.8 i  0.82 
1000  0.83  0.87  0.88 
Median  300  0.93  0.91  0.91 
1000  0.99  0.95  0.95 
Note. Descriptive statistics for 100 simulations at t  =  300  and t  =  1,000;  mean and me- 
dian values of P  (player 1 chooses ql  =  0). 
than player 1; (ii) since player 1 quickly learns to offer qt  =  0 with high 
probability, player 2 has multiple strategies (namely those with a given 
response  to  ql  =. 0)  which have  almost the  same expected payoff, so 
learning among these is slow; and (iii) since player 2's payoffs are small 
when q~  =  0,  learning is  slow even at  distinguishing the  two positive 
responses to q~  =  0. 
Figure lb shows the same information for five simulations of the best 
shot game using the local experimentation model (with e =  0.05 and/z = 
~o = 0). These simulations have the same initial conditions as those reported 
in Figure la. Note that the positive experimentation parameter makes an 
important difference in simulation A, where it saves the strategy ql  =  0 
from extinction. ~8 The. qualitative features of the other simulations go in 
the same direction as when e was zero. Figure lc shows the similar results 
for the  local experimentation model with forgetting (e  =  0.05,  tz  =  0, 
~o =  0.001). 
Table  II  shows  that  in all  three  models  the  median probability that 
player 1 will choose the perfect equilibrium quantity q~  =  0 is over 90% 
by round 300. 
Figure 2a shows the results of ten simulations of the ultimatum game, 
using the cutoff  model. As this figure contains a lot of information, we will 
walk through one of the simulations in detail in just a moment. The figure 
shows results for the first 300 rounds, and then for round 100,000. Again, 
the results are read vertically, e.g., simulation A is represented by the first 
column. The dark line in rows 1 to 9 graphs the probability that player 1 will 
make the corresponding demand, the dotted line graphs the probability that 
18 Strategy qt  =  0 is also saved from extinction when we run this simulation with both e 
and/z positive, so it is the presence of the positive rate of experimentation, not the absence 
of the cutoff, which accounts for the difference in the intermediate term. 184  ROTH  AND  EREV 
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LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  185 
b 
Mean 
7.5 
5 
2.5" 
PROB" 
P(9) 
P(8) 
P(7) 
P(6) 
P(5)- 
P(2 
~ 
O 000 
..........  ~  .............  ~  .........  ~  ........... 
pIImlllBOOOQO 
~0o00 
L 
ZZZ  ~seeA~,&i~ 
t  ~. .........  L_  i._  .... 
-  It BA~. 
iIL~  --. 
A  B  C  D 
SIMULATION 
C  C  ¢  Prob of demm'td  It T  =  0-100 
:-  ~-  -"  Prob of  rejection  at T  -  0-100 
•  •  •  Modal demand 
-~  ¢  :  Mean demand 
O. 0  ' 0  Demand at T  -  1,000, 10,000, 100,000 and 1,000,000 
-6. o  - b  Pmb of mJeatfon at T  =  1,000, 10,000, 100,000  imd 1,000,000 
FIG.  2--Continued. 
player 2 will reject that demand. 19 The top row graphs the mean demand. 
In each column the modal demand, which may change from round to round, 
n9 Since the round  1 propensities are chosen from a uniform distribution over strategies, 
there is an a  priori probability (before the propensities are chosen) that player 1 will make 
each demand from 1 to 9 with probability I/9. And since player 2's strategies are choicesof 
maximally acceptable demands, there is an a priori probability of 0 that a demand of I will 
be rejected, of 1/9 that a demand of 2 will be rejected, on up to a probability of 8/9 that a 
demand of 9 will be rejected. Of course in any given simulation, the ex post probabilities, 
after the initial propensities are chosen, may be different, and so the distribution of demands 
and rejections in round  1 may be different. 186 
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is highlighted by a broader line. The demands which remain with positive 
probability at round 100,000 are shown by asterisks, and the rejection proba- 
bilities which remain positive at round 100,000 are shown by circles. 
To  make  things  clear,  look  at  simulation  A,  represented  by  the  first 
column of Figure 2a. Consider first the demands of player  I. In the very 
first rounds,  the modal demand of player  1 is 5, represented by a single 
broad dot in row 5.  Almost immediately,  the modal demand drops to 4, 
however,  represented  by the broad  line in row 4.  In the meantime,  the 
probability that player 1 demands 5 declines quickly to almost zero, while LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  187 
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the probability  that he demands 6  starts to rise,  as does the probability 
that he demands 7. The probability that player 1 demands anything other 
than 4, 5, 6, or 7 starts low in this simulation, and drops quickly to zero. 
As we near the end of the 300 trials,  the modal demand shifts from 4 to 
6,  represented  by the broad line  in row 6.  By  the end of the 300 trials, 
the probability  that player  1 will demand 4  is still not much below 0.5, 
but it has dropped almost to zero by the end of 100,000 trials, as indicated 
by the asterisk in row 4.  Similarly, the other demands which still have a 
positive  probability  at  round  I00,000  are  6  and  7,  as  indicated  by  the 188 
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asterisks in those rows, and these probabilities have both reached approxi- 
mately 0.5. The lack of an asterisk in rows 8 and 9 (and in rows 1, 2, 3, 
and 5) means that the probability that player l  will make those demands 
has  dropped  to  zero  by round  100,000,  i.e.,  these demands  have  been 
completely extinguished. 
Continuing to look at simulation A, note that the probability that player 
2  rejects a  demand  of 8 quickly rises  to  near  1,  as represented  by the 
dotted line in row 8, and at round  100,000 it is very near l, as represented 
by the open circle. The probability that player 2 will reject a demand of 
7 however, has dropped to zero in the very first rounds. This means that, 
with very high probability, player 2's maximal acceptable demand is 7, but 
by round  100,000 there is still a small chance that his maximal acceptable 
demand is 8. In simulation A all of player 2's other strategies have quickly 
dropped away, but in some of the other simulations  the progress of the 
dotted lines representing player 2's probability of rejecting each demand 
can be more clearly followed. 
Finally, the overall progress of simulation A is reflected in the very top 
row, which graphs  the mean demand of player 1.  Notice that this  starts 
around  5,  and  after  an  almost  imperceptible  dip  climbs  very  slowly 
throughout the first 300 rounds. (So even though the modal demand drops 
to 4 for many initial  rounds,  the increasing  probability of demands  of 5 
or 6  keep the  mean  demand  moving up.)  By round  100,000,  player  l's LEARNING IN  GAMES"  DATA AND  MODELS  189 
mean  demand  has  moved to between  6  and  7.  (Note that  it cannot go 
above 7 even as t goes to infinity, since the demands of 8 and 9 have been 
extinguished, and in the cutoff model extinction is forever  .... ) 
Looking  now  at  all  10  simulations,  observe  that  even after  100,000 
rounds,  the  modal  demands  are  mostly between 4  and  6,  far from the 
perfect equilibrium  demand  of 9.  In fact,  although the  process has  not 
converged in every case by round 100,000, in all ten of these simulations 
the probability that a  demand of 9 or 8 is ever made has been driven to 
zero, so that convergence must be to a demand no greater than 7. Some 
simulations  do  converge  to  demands  of 9,  but  only rarely:  descriptive 
statistics are given for the cutoff model in Table III. Of the 35 out of 100 
simulations that had converged by round 100,000 to a single demand with 
probability one, only 3 converged to a  demand of 9  (while 9  converged 
to  a  demand  of 6).  The  picture  is  similar  when  we  look at  the  modal 
demands at t =  100,000 for all 100 simulations in the sample (i.e., including 
those which have not yet converged to a  single demand):  only 5 have a 
modal demand of 9, compared, e.g., to 23 with a  modal demand of 6. 
Of the 10 simulations shown in Figure 2a, four have actually converged 
by round I00,000, in the sense that a single demand is made with certainty. 
These are worth closer examination. 
Simulation C  converged, after 2090 rounds, to an equilibrium in which 
player 1 demands 7 with certainty, and player 2 accepts this demand but 
rejects  higher  demands  with  positive  probability. 2°  Simulation  D  con- 
verged, after 21,723 rounds to an equilibrium at which player 1 demands 
6  with  certainty and  player 2  accepts,  but  rejects higher demands  with 
high probability (i.e., player 2  sets his  maximal acceptable demand at 6 
with high probability).  Simulation E  converged, after 26,865  rounds, to 
an outcome that is not a  Nash equilibrium:  player 1 is demanding 7, but 
player 2 would not reject a demand of 8. Simulation I, after 3988 rounds, 
also converges to an outcome that is not a Nash equilibrium:  player 1 is 
demanding 6  with certainty, but player 2 accepts demands as large as 8 
with high probability (although he rejects demands of 9 with certainty), 
so player 1 could do better by demanding 8. '-I 
20 At round 100,000 player 2's probability for setting his maximal acceptable demand to 
7 (and hence of rejecting offers of 8 or 9) had declined to 0.11306. (Otherwise his maximal 
acceptable demand is 9,  i.e.,  he accepts all demands.) Because player  1 converged to 
demanding 7 with certainty, both of these strategies give player 2 a payoff of 3, so there is 
no more learning going on, only random drift between m2 = 7 and m2 = 9. Of course, since 
the cutoff probability/z is positive, either of these may go to zero. By round I00,000 the 
state of the system has drifted a little out of equilibrium: if player 1 were to demand 8, his 
expected payoff would be 7.096, i.e., a little more than 7. 
2t However, note that both of these non-Nash equilibrium outcomes are consistent with 
various notions of "self-confirming" equilibria such as those studied by Fudenberg and 
Levine (1993). 190  ROTH  AND  EREV 
TABLE  III 
ULTIMATUM GAME WITH RANDOM INITIAL PROPENSITIES 
Cutoff model 
/~ =  0.01,  e  =0 
Experimentation  with 
forgetting model 
/z  =  0, e  =  0.05,  ~  =  0.001 
No. of sim with  No.  No. of sim with 
Demand  the  mode  converged  Mean P  the mode  Mean P 
i  0  0  0.00  0  0.00 
2  2  1  0.02  0  0.00 
3  4  2  0.05  0  0.00 
4  12  3  0.12  0  0.00 
5  18  7  0.20  0  0.00 
6  23  9  0.22  0  0.03 
7  19  8  0.19  8  0.19 
8  17  2  0.14  80  0.57 
9  5  3  0.05  12  0.21 
Sum  100  35  1.00  100  1.00 
Local experimentation  models  (without forgetting) 
/z  =  0, e  =  0.1,~o  =  0 
No. of sim with  No.  of sim with 
Demand  the  mode  Mean P  the  mode  Mean  P 
p. =  0,  e  =  0.05,  ~p =  0 
I  0  0.00  0  0.00 
2  1  0.01  0  0.01 
3  3  0.05  3  0.05 
4  8  0.11  I1  0.11 
5  22  0.19  19  0.18 
6  23  0.23  25  0.23 
7  22  0.20  27  0.25 
8  15  0.14  11  0.13 
9  6  0.06  4  0.05 
Sum  100  1.00  100  1.00 
Note. Descriptive statistics for 100 simulations at t  =  100,000. 
To adequately compare the three models for the ultimatum game,  we 
need to carry the simulations out to t =  1,000,000.  Figures 2b-2d graph 
the results for five such simulations, for the cutoff, local experimentation, 
and  experimentation  with  forgetting  models,  respectively.  Each  of the 
five  simulations  A  through  E  in these  three  figures  are  begun  with  the 
same initial propensities (i.e.  the randomly generated initial propensities 
are  the  same  in  each  of the  three  simulations  labeled  A,  etc.),  so  the 
results of each simulation can be compared for each of the three models. 
This  comparison  is  easiest  to  make  by  looking at  the  top row  of each LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  191 
figure, which graphs the mean demand. For convenience, the means for 
all three models are presented together in Fig. 2e, for t  =  0-100 and for 
t  =  1000, 10,000,  100,000,  and 1,000,000. 
For our present purposes, the notable feature of these three models is 
that they are not very different until t  =  10,000,  even though their long 
term behavior is quite different, in that the experimentation model with 
forgetting converges to the perfect equilibrium demand in all five simula- 
tions, while the other two models do not. 
The easiest way to see the differences between the models is to focus 
on simulation D, in which the cutoff model converged to a unique demand 
of 6,  shortly before  t  =  1000 (at  t  --  801). So  in  Figures  2b  and  2e, 
the cutoff model is flat for simulation D from t  =  I000  on. In the local 
experimentation model without forgetting (Fig.  2c)  the probability that 
player 1 will demand 6 starts to decline even before t =  100, although it 
remains  the  modal offer at  t  =  1,000,000.  But in  the  experimentation 
model with forgetting (Fig. 2d) the probability that the demand will be 6 
has dropped to virtually zero by t  =  100,000 (at which time the modal 
demand is  8),  and  by  t  =  1,000,000  the  modal  demand is  the  perfect 
equilibrium demand of 9. 22 
Table III presents some statistics for 100 simulations out to t =  100,000, 
for various choices of parameters. It serves to emphasize just how long 
the long term can be. Note that by t  =  100,000 the modal probability is 
only for a demand of 8 in the forgetting model, although the t =  !,000,000 
simulations (Fig. 2e) reveal that with high probability this will eventually 
move to a demand of 9. 
So a  conventional treatment of these models, which focuses on their 
asymptotic behavior, would treat the cutoff  model and the experimentation 
with forgetting model as fundamentally different. But their intermediate 
term behavior is the same, and we will see in what follows that this is 
what is descriptive of the experimental results. 
After all this somewhat complex behavior it is a relief to look at Figs. 
3a-3c which each show five market simulations. (Once again, these figures 
are read vertically, each column corresponding to one simulation.) Each 
simulation has ten buyers, each of whose initial propensities are randomly 
drawn (independently) from a  uniform distribution as described above, 
with the  same initial propensities being used for all three models. The 
public announcement of the market price is modeled by having each player 
update his propensity to play the winning bid after each round.  23 Figures 
22 These simulations have e  =  0.05. When e  =  0.1 the mode for the model with forgetting 
appears (from a  small sample) to be more often at 8 than 9, even at t  =  1,000,000. 
23 The reinforcement x (equal to the profit from the winning bid) is distributed among the 
ten players; e.g., if the winning bid is 8, the tendency to play 8 is increased by 2/10 for all 
players. When the propensities are updated by x (instead of x~ 10), convergence to the perfect 
equilibrium price is correspondingly faster. 192 
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3a-3c graph the average probability over the I0 buyers that an individual 
buyer will state each of his feasible bids. (So this is a measure of individual 
behavior, not merely of market behavior as we would get by graphing the 
probability for the maximum bid.) As the figures show,  this  probability 
quickly goes to  1 for the highest feasible bid, and  zero for all  the other 
bids, using either the cutoff or local experimentation  models. 
These simulations show that the three games have different properties, 
which shows up early in the simulations, even using dynamic models with 
different long term behavior.  What these simulations do not do is model PRICE 
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the  experimental  environments  discussed  in  Section  II,  because  these 
simulations do not model the manner in which a population of experimental 
subjects gained experience  with changing partners,  nor do these simula- 
tions model the initial conditions observed in the experiments. Since these 
simulations do show that the ultimatum game in particular is sensitive to 
the  initial  conditions,  this  is  likely  to  be  important.  We  address  these 
issues next. 194 
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VI.  SIMULATION  OF THE  EXPERIMENTS 
Here we describe simulations  which model the experimental environ- 
ments in which the data discussed in Section II were collected. We first 
describe how the  initial  propensities  to  play each  pure  strategy  of the 
simplified games described in Section IV were estimated from the data. 
Separate estimations are carried out for each cell of the experiments, i.e., 
for the  ultimatum  and  market  games in each of four countries,  and  for LEARNING IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  195 
the best shot game in each of two information conditions. We begin with 
a description of how the initial conditions were estimated for the ultimatum 
game, which the results of the previous section suggest is the game which 
will be most sensitive to the estimates of initial propensities. 
The  Ultimatum Game.  Each of the observed player 1 demands in the 
first two  rounds  was  first  transformed into the  closest demand in  the 
simplified game (an integer from 1 to 9).  When two values were equally 
close the lower one was chosen (i.e., 0.5  was rounded downward). The 
initial propensity (IP) to follow each strategy was computed as the relative 
frequency of the transformed demands, which are tabulated in the appen- 
dix. For example, if 6 of the 60 demands were in the range [5.5,  6.5) the 
IP of 6 was set to be 6/60  =  .I. 
To assess the initial propensities of player 2 the proportion of rejections 
of each of the nine demands was first computed. Under the assumption 
that player 2's strategies are of the form "accept a demand of no more 
than m" these proportions should not decrease as the demands increase. 
As can be seen jn the appendix, violations of this assumption were ob- 
served in only 6 of the 32 cases (8 (increase)  x  4 (countries)).  In order 
to compute the IP,  it was assumed that these violations reflect random 
error and monotonicity was restored by "pooling" categories. For exam- 
ple, if4 of 6 demands of "8" were rejected and only 2 of 4 demands of "9" 
were rejected, the rejection rates in those two categories were replaced by 
a pooled estimate of  0.6 -- (4 + 2)/(6 + 4). The six monotonicity  corrections 
are also presented in the appendix. 
Once monotonicity was restored the calculation of the initial propensit- 
ies is straightforward. If the corrected rejection rate of demand i is R(i), 
the estimated tendency to follow a  strategy that accepts  i,  but  rejects 
higher demands is IP (m =  i)  =  R(i +  1)  -  R(i). 
The  Market Game.  Buyers' bids  were treated precisely as  player  1 
demands in the ultimatum game. Each of the observed prices in the first 
two rounds was transformed into the closest price in the simplified game 
(with  upward  rounding--see the  appendix).  IPs  were  assessed  by the 
relative frequencies. As noted earlier, no rejections by sellers were ob- 
served. 
The  Best  Shot  Game.  For the  best  shot game we  had the  smallest 
number of observations, but the largest number of possible strategies. To 
reduce  the  number  of strategies for which there  are  no  observations, 
observations that fell between two strategies were divided between the 
two. Player l's observed choices (ofq~ =  0,  I, 2, 3, or 4) in the first two 
rounds of the experiment were transformed into the closest demand in 
the simplified game (q i = 0, 2, or 4), by counting intermediate observations 
as half  an observation each for the simplified strategies (i.e., an observation 196  ROTH  AND  EREV 
of q~  =  1 is counted as half an observation each of ql  =  0 and q~  =  2) 
and the IPs were estimated by the relative frequencies. For player 2, the 
probabilities of each of the possible responses (q2 =  0, 2, or 4) were first 
calculated from the simplified player I behavior in the first two rounds of 
the  experiment.  Then,  the  probability  of each  of the  27  response  rule 
triples (response to q t  =  0 with x, to q~  =  2 with y, and to q~  =  4 with 
z) was estimated to be P(xyz)  =  P(x[O)P(y[2)P(z[4)  (see the Appendix). 
The simulations were modeled on the experiments, so that in each best 
shot simulation there are ten player I's and ten player 2's. In each round 
of each  simulation, ten games are  played,  each one  pairing one of the 
player  l's  against  one  of the  player 2's,  and from round  to  round  the 
pairings change, so that after ten  rounds each player  1 has played each 
player 2. In the full information simulations, each player 1 starts with the 
(same)  initial  propensities  estimated  from  the  data  for  players  1,  and 
each player 2 starts with the initial propensities estimated for players 2. 
Similarly in the partial information simulations, the players  1 and 2 each 
start with the propensities estimated from that data set. 
Figure 4 shows representative results for the best shot game. The first 
two columns summarize the experimental data observed in Prasnikar and 
Roth (1992), while the next two columns graphs the average of one hundred 
simulations with parameters/x  =  0,  e  =  0.05,  and ~o =  0.001,  for times 
t =  0,  10, and I00 (i.e., for substantially more than the 10 rounds actually 
observed in the experiments). Both the experimental data and the simula- 
tion  results  are  presented  in  terms  of the  simplified game,  so  that,  in 
particular,  the  simulations  in each  information condition are  initialized 
from the corresponding data as shown in the figure. 
Table IV displays the results of 100  simulations for each of the three 
models, for both the full and partial information conditions. As the table 
shows, the three models are virtually identical at both t =  10 and t =  100. 
(The simulations with e  =  0.1  are very similar.) 
Looking first at the Full Information simulations, note that even after 
only ten  rounds,  the  probability  that  player  1 will  choose  the  perfect 
equilibrium quantity qj  =  0 is just about 80%, while the probability that 
player 2 will respond to q~  =  0 with the perfect equilibrium response of 
q2  =  4 is slightly over 50%.  Thus the simulations are strikingly close to 
the experimental  data in  real  time,  i.e.,  in  I0 periods.  By t  =  100  the 
simulations have moved still closer to perfect equilibrium, with player 2's 
response moving more slowly than player I's, for the reasons discussed 
earlier. 
The Partial Information simulation results are also comparable to the 
experimental results in real time. At t  =  I0 the probability is over 50% 
that player  1 will play the  perfect equilibrium,  and  not quite  20%  that 
player 2 will make the perfect equilibrium response.  By t  =  I00 player 1 LEARNING IN  GAMES:  DATA AND  MODELS  197 
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has  moved very much closer to  perfect equilibrium,  while player 2  is 
learning much more slowly. 
Comparing the Full and Partial Information conditions, we see that in 
the  simulations, just  as  in  the  experimental data,  the full  information 
condition moves towards perfect equilibrium more quickly than the partial 
information condition. This  makes plausible the hypothesis that,  in the 
experiments as in the simulations, the effect of letting the players know 198  ROTH  AND  EREV 
TABLE  IV 
BEST SHOT GAME WITH INITIAL PROPENSITIES ESTIMATED FROM THE DATA 
Model 
t  ~  =  0.01  e  =  0.05  e  =  0.05,  ~  =  0.001 
Full  information 
Player  I:  Mean and median values of P(player I chooses q~  =  0) 
Mean  10 
100 
I000 
Median  10 
100 
1000 
Player 2:Mean  and median values 
Mean  10 
100 
1000 
Median  10 
100 
1000 
Player  1:  Mean and median values 
Mean  10 
100 
1000 
Median  10 
100 
1000 
Player 2:  Mean and median values 
Mean  10 
100 
I000 
Median  10 
100 
1000 
0.80  0.78  0.78 
0.96  0.93  0.93 
1.00  0.96  0.97 
0.81  0.79  0.79 
0.97  0.93  0.93 
1.00  0.96  0.97 
of P(player 2 chooses q2  =  4 ] ql  =  0) 
0.56  0.55  0.55 
0.67  0.63  0.64 
0.78  0.74  0.77 
0.56  0.55  0.56 
0.67  0.69  0.65 
0.78  0.74  0.78 
Partial  information 
of P(player 1 chooses ql  =  0) 
0.53  0.51  0.52 
0.88  0.85  0.86 
0.99  0.95  0.96 
0.53  0.51  0.53 
0.88  0.85  0.87 
0.99  0.96  0.96 
of P(player 2 chooses q2  =  4]ql  =  0) 
0.16  0.17  0.18 
0.19  0.20  0.21 
0.29  0.30  0.36 
0.15  0.17  0.17 
0.19  0.19  0.20 
0.28  0.31  0.36 
Note.  Descriptive statistics for 100 simulations at t  =  10,  t  =  100, and t  =  1000. 
each others' payoffs is felt primarily in the first period, after which similar 
adaptive behavior is observed. 
Figure 5 shows results for the ultimatum game. The first four columns 
summarize  the  experimental data  observed in  Roth  et  al.  (1991),  while 
the next four columns graph the average of one hundred simulations with 
parameters/x =  0, e  =  0.05, and ~o -- 0.001, for times t  =  0,  10, and  100. 
In the ultimatum game simulations there are also ten player l's and ten LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  199 
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/x  =  0,  ~p  =  0.001. 
player 2's.  In each round,  10 games  are played,  each one pairing one of 
the player  l's against one of the player 2's, and from round to round the 
pairings  change,  so that after  10 rounds each  player  1 has  played  each 
player 2. In each of the country simulations, each player 1 starts with the 
(same) initial propensities estimated from the data for players  1, and each 
player 2 starts with the initial propensities estimated for players 2 for that 
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TABLE  V 
ULTIMATUM GAME WITH  INITIAL PROPENSITIES  ESTIMATED  FROM THE  DATA 
Mean demand 
Mean  probability  Probability  of 
simulation  with 
t  =  10  t  =  100  t  =  1000  mode above 5 
Med. 
move  t  =  10  100  1000  P(5)  P(6)  P(5)  P(6)  P(5)  P(6)  t  =  10  100  1000 
Cutoff model:  S(I) =  10, e  =  0,/,t  =  0.01,  qJ  =  0 
Israel  3.5  5.47  5.63  5.83  0.37  0.28  0.39  0.36  0.39  0.40  0.47  0.63  0.83 
Japan  >1000  5.13  5.17  5.29  0.34  0.22  0.43  0.26  0.46  0.27  0.13  0.17  0.28 
U.S.A.  >1000  5.09  5.25  5.45  0.50  0.28  0.53  0.31  0.53  0.33  0.09  0.25  0.45 
Slovenia  >1000  5.00  5.01  5.12  0.60  0.20  0.61  0.24  0.62  0.25  0.00  0.01  0.12 
Local experimentation  model:  S(I) =  10, e  =  0.05, p. =  0, qJ =  0 
Israel  4.0  5.49  5.71  5.92  0.37  0.35  0.34  0.41  0.29  0.46  0.49  0.71  0.91 
Japan  >1000  5.16  5.20  5.42  0.40  0.26  0.41  0.31  0.39  0.36  0.16  0.20  0.42 
U.S.A.  510.0  5.10  5.32  5.55  0.49  0.31  0.45  0.35  0.39  0.40  0.10  0.32  0.55 
Slovenia  >1000  5.01  5.05  5.25  0.58  0.24  0.53  0.30  0.47  0.37  0.01  0.05  0.25 
Experimentation  model  with forgetting:  S(I) =  10, e  =  0.05, ~  =  0, ~b =  0.001 
Israel  4.0  5.49  5.71  5.95  0.37  0.35  0.34  0.41  0.28  0.46  0.49  0.71  0.94 
Japan  626.5  5.16  5.21  5.53  0.40  0.26  0.41  0.31  0.38  0.37  0.16  0.21  0.52 
U.S.A.  428.5  5.10  5.32  5.64  0.49  0.31  0.45  0.36  0.38  0.41  0.10  0.32  0.64 
Slovenia  >1000  5.01  5.05  5.31  0.58  0.24  0.53  0.30  0.46  0.39  0.01  0.05  0.31 
Note.  Descriptive  statistics  for  100 simulations  at t  =  10, t  =  100, and t  =  1000. 
Table V  presents mean results of I00 simulations of each of the three 
models, starting from the initial propensities estimated for each country, 
at times t =  10, t =  I00, and t =  1000.  Recall that at round  1 the modal 
demand in every country was 5, and in the experimental data it had moved 
by round  10 to a modal demand of 6 in Israel, to modal demands of 5.5 
and  6  in Japan,  but remained  at  a  modal demand  of 5  in the  U.S.  and 
Slovenia.  The first  column  of numbers  (labeled  MedMove)  reports  the 
median  round  in  which  the  modal  demand  moved  from  5  to  6  in  the 
simulations. In each of the three models the modal demand in the Israeli 
simulations moved from 5 to 6 in real time (on average by round 4), while 
the Slovenian simulations remained at a mode of 5 through time t =  1000. 
The modal demands in the Japanese and US simulations sometimes moved 
from 5  to 6  in the  intermediate  term,  but were sensitive  to the path  of 
play in each simulation. Each of the other descriptive measures preserves 
the relationship that demands decline as we move from Israel to Slovenia, 
with Japan  and the  U.S.  in between.  For example,  at t  =  10 the  mean 
demands  in the cutoff model simulations decline from 5.47 for Israel to 
5.00  for Slovenia,  while  the  probability  that  a  player  1 will demand  6 
declines from 0.28  to 0.20,  and the probability of a simulation in which 
the modal demand is above 5 declines from 0.47 to 0.00.  Notice that the 
forgetting model, which we have seen moves much closer to the perfect 
equilibrium than the local experimentation model in the long term, never- LEARNING IN  GAMES:  DATA AND  MODELS  201 
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0.05,  p. =  0, ~0  =  0.001. 
theless  yields very similar predictions  in the  intermediate  term.  And  it 
is the  intermediate  term  results  (for each of the  models) that  track the 
experimental data well. 
Note also that the results of the ultimatum game simulations  initiated 
with data from the four countries are quite different in the intermediate 
term from those initiated  with  random  propensities.  Thus the observed 
initial behaviors were not random, but reflected something of the players' 202  ROTH  AND  EREV 
TABLE  VI 
MARKET GAME WITH INITIAL PROPENSITIES  ESTIMATED  FROM THE  DATA 
t  =  10  t  =  100 
P(8)  P(9)  P(9.75)  P(SPE)  P(9.75)  P(SPE) 
Cutoff model:  e  =  0, p.  =  0.01, $  =  0 
Israel  0.18  0.30 
Japan  0.22  0.29 
U.S.A.  0.20  0.24 
Slovenia  0.28  0.24 
Local experimentation  model:  e  =  0.05, 
Israel  0.18  0.31 
Japan  0.22  0.29 
U.S.A.  0.20  0.24 
SIovenia  0.28  0.25 
Local experimentation  model  with forgetting: 
Israel  0.18  0.31  0.38 
Japan  0.22  0.29  0.26 
U.S.A.  0.20  0.24  0.08 
Slovenia  0.28  0.25  0.18 
1.00  0.79  1.00 
0.14  0.75  1.00 
0.00  0.69  1.00 
0.00  0.71  1.00 
0.38 
0.26 
0.09 
0.19 
t~ =  0,~0  =0 
0.38  1.00  0.76  1.00 
0.26  0.07  0.72  1.00 
0.08  0.00  0.65  1.00 
0.18  0.00  0.69  1.00 
e  =  0.05, p,  =  0, ~  =  0.001 
1.00  0.77  1.00 
0.23  0.73  1.00 
0.00  0.67  1.00 
0.00  0.70  1.00 
Note.  Descriptive  statistics  for  100  simulations  at  t  =  10 and  t  =  100. 
probability  that an  individual  buyer bids x.  P(SPE)  equals the probability 
price is 9.75. 
P(x) equals the 
that the modal 
perceptions of the game--perceptions that were different in the different 
countries. 
Figure  6  shows  results  for the  market  game.  The first four columns 
summarize  the  experimental  data  observed  in Roth  et  al.  (1991),  while 
the next four columns graphs the average of one hundred simulations with 
parameters/z  =  0, e  =  0.05, and ~p =  0.001, for times t =  0,  10, and  100. 
In the market simulations, as in the experiments, two markets were run 
simultaneously, with changing  sets of buyers.  There were ten buyers in 
each market simulation, and in each country condition all buyers had the 
same  initial propensities,  as  estimated from the  data. z4 Consistent  with 
the  results  of the  random  simulations,  the  different initial  propensities 
have no lasting effect. Table VI gives statistics from 100 simulations, for 
each of the three models. In each country simulation, each bidder quickly 
24 To model  the fact that in the experiment all subjects  learned  the winning bid in both 
of the markets,  in the simulations there were two reinforcements (to the two winning bids) 
distributed among the 20 players. If, for example, the winning bids were 9 in market A and 
9.75 in market B, the propensity to play 9 is increased by  1/20, and the propensity to play 
9.75 is increased by 0.25/20 for all players. LEARNING  IN  GAMES:  DATA  AND  MODELS  203 
converges to bidding the perfect equilibrium price with high probability. 
And the models track the data reasonably well in real time, i.e., by t  = 
10, while by t  =  100 the simulations have converged almost completely 
to perfect equilibrium behavior. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
The substantive results of this paper are easy enough to summarize. 
Independently of the experimental data,  the simulation results  starting 
from random initial propensities reveal a  structural difference between 
the ultimatum game and the other two games. And in comparison with 
the experimental data, the intermediate term predictions of both the cutoff 
model and the local experimentation models track the major experimental 
observations well. Despite the different long term behavior of these dy- 
namic models, their intermediate term predictions agree with the experi- 
mental data in that: 
1.  In the maFket and best shot games, both predicted and observed 
behavior quickly approach perfect equilibrium play, but in the ultimatum 
game neither predicted nor observed behavior approaches perfect equi- 
librium. 
2.  Both predicted and observed behavior approach perfect equilib- 
rium play more quickly in the best shot game with full information (in 
which the experimental subjects knew one another's payoffs) than in the 
best shot game with partial information (in which the experimental subjects 
knew only their own payoffs). 
3.  Both predicted and observed behavior in the ultimatum games (but 
not in the market or best shot games) are different in the different countries 
sampled, and the predicted intermediate term differences track the ob- 
served differences (within the limitations of the simplified games). 
These results indicate that even very simple adaptive models may be quite 
useful both for distinguishing which games are likely to be sensitive to 
initial conditions and for predicting how initial conditions matter.  25 
,2 And while it seems clear that much of the progress to be made in understanding learning 
in games will come on the interface of economics and psychology, the fact that there are 
some  games  which exhibit both  predicted  and observed behavior that seems  not to  be 
sensitive either to initial conditions or subject pools suggests that there is also substantial 
progress to be made by understanding which classes of games fall into this category. That 
is, there appear to be classes of games for which it will turn out that the observed learning 
behavior is primarily a property of the game, rather than of the particular learning processes 
used by the players. (This is the traditional economists' viewpoint, but similar views have 
begun to emerge among cognitive psychologists.  See in particular Anderson (1990),  who 
argues that in many cases the best available predictions about mental processes come from 
an understanding of the structure of the environment.) 204  ROTH  AND  EREV 
Recall that the adaptive models studied here do not model in any way 
what players know about the game, or believe about the future behavior 
of other players. That  such simple dynamic models, when initiated with 
first period observed behavior,  nevertheless do a good job of predicting 
how observed behavior will  evolve, suggests  that  a  substantial  part  of 
how players' knowledge and beliefs influence the game may be reflected 
already in first round data. For example, the data from the two information 
conditions  of the best shot game  suggest that  players'  behavior in that 
game approaches perfect equilibrium faster when they know each others' 
payoffs. But the simulation results suggest that the effect of this knowledge 
may be primarily to alter the first period behavior, and that  the ways in 
which  players adapt  in  subsequent  periods  to  their  experience  may be 
similar in both information  conditions.  The  same can be said about the 
between-country differences in the ultimatum game data. It could be that 
these differences result from different perceptions  (of the game,  and of 
their  countrymen)  held  by players in different countries,  or it could be 
that they result from different patterns of adaptation.  That the same dy- 
namic  model can  track  the  between-country differences when  initiated 
from the first round data lends support to the former hypothesis. 
Of course the comments of the previous paragraph  are still somewhat 
speculative, based as they are on a relatively small data set arising from 
only three kinds of games. Preliminary indications are that the correspon- 
dence between predicted and observed behavior may survive the transition 
to larger  data sets  and  different  kinds of games.  We hope to report  on 
both some successes and failures of this simple model in a future paper. 
To speculate a  little on theoretical matters,  there are reasons to think 
that these results will also be robust to the choice of dynamics,  so that 
very different dynamic models might produce similar results. The family 
of models we have considered are driven in the early rounds by the payoff 
differences among strategies, based on the initial propensities to play each 
strategy.  For example,  the  reason that  behavior in the ultimatum  game 
remains distant from the perfect equilibrium is that the propensity to make 
very high demands falls more quickly than the propensity to accept very 
high demands rises. This is because the difference between accepting and 
rejecting a  very high demand  is small and  thus has only modest impact 
on the propensities of players 2, while the difference for players 1 between 
having a very high demand rejected, and earning zero, or having a moder- 
ately high demand accepted, and consequently earning more than half the 
pie,  is much larger,  and  more quickly increases the propensity to make 
only moderately high  demands.  Once players  1 seldom make very high 
demands,  there is even less pressure on players 2 to learn not to reject 
them, and  so  on. 26 
26 A  similar conclusion about ultimatum games is reached by Gale et al.  (1995),  using a 
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Note also that there are good reasons to think that the actual learning 
rules (or even the strategies) used by the subjects in the experiments differ 
in important ways from our simple models, and that this too supports the 
conjectured robustness of the results.  27 That the simple simulated learning 
rules may be very different from those used by the experimental subjects, 
but both sets of rules produce similar intermediate term outcomes, sug- 
gests that very different learning rules will quickly approach perfect equi- 
librium in the best shot and market games, but not in the ultimatum game. 
Methodologically, an important difference between this paper and most 
of the recent theoretical literature on game dynamics is our concern with 
intermediate term results, rather than asymptotic convergence. Although 
we have not attempted to define the "intermediate term" any more pre- 
cisely than to say that it starts when the learning curve flattens out, this 
has not proved to be a problem in looking at the simulated behavior we 
report, precisely because the learning curves soon become very flat in- 
deed. For the dynamics considered here, the intermediate term starts in 
the tens of iterations, and, at least in the ultimatum game, does not give 
way to the sometimes very different long term predictions for thousands 
or even hundreds of thousands. Of course these numbers will be different 
for different dynamics.  28 To the extent that intermediate term behavior 
of dynamic models is important, it may be useful for theorists to pay more 
attention to the entire vector field generated by a dynamic, and not just 
to its limit points and basins of attraction.  29 
27 Particularly in repeated games,  the set of strategies possibly available to the players 
may be enormous. The traditional posture of game theory has been to regard all possible 
strategies as available, but just as players may not be hyperrational in other respects, their 
capacity to consider a  vast number of strategies may also be limited. (One attempt to deal 
with this has been to represent the strategies available to a  player in a  repeated game as 
those which can be implemented by finite state automata of limited size. An early example 
of this  approach  can  be found  in Tsetlin,  1973.  Before  his  untimely death in  1966,  he 
developed interesting models of learning in repeated games, with players modeled as autom- 
ata.) Research in psychology has often identified particular strategies which may occur with 
high initial propensities. For example, in repeated experiments with T mazes, rats have an 
initial propensity to follow an alternation strategy (i.e., not to choose the same leg of the 
maze  twice in succession); see,  e.g.,  Dember and Fowler (1958).  We anticipate that the 
accuracy of predictions of models like those considered in this paper may be improved by 
assessing the repeated game strategies the subjects employ. 
28 For our present purposes, the very slow convergence of the models without forgetting 
only serves to emphasize the difference between the ultimatum game and the other two 
games (in which all three models nevertheless converge quickly). For more extended study 
of games with very slow convergence properties it will likely be desirable to consider faster 
converging dynamics, e.g.,  by having a  positive forgetting parameter, or some other way 
of keeping the strengths of the propensities from growing without bound. This has the effect 
of giving more weight to recent events, instead of weighting all payoffs equally whenever 
they occur, as in our models without forgetting. (The flat learning curves come about because 
after a while there are so many more past events than recent ones.) 
29 More generally, new tools may be required, since for stochastic learning rules under- 
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To bring together our conclusions about games and about models, recall 
once again that the three games considered here have similar equilibria: 
in the ultimatum and market games all prices can be supported by some 
Nash  equilibrium,  but only extreme outcomes,  in  which  all  the  wealth 
accrues to one side, can be supported by a perfect equilibrium. Similarly, 
the perfect equilibrium of the best shot game yields extreme payoff differ- 
ences. The experimental  results of Roth et al.  (1991)  and Prasnikar  and 
Roth (1992) show that this similarity of equilibria does not produce similar- 
ity of behavior: only in two of the games did observed behavior approach 
the perfect equilibrium.  To the extent that  equilibrium is reached,  if at 
all, through a dynamic adjustment process that begins out of equilibrium, 
the  possibility  of dissimilar  behavior  seems  natural,  since  games  with 
similar equilibria may be quite dis-similar out of equilibrium. The present 
paper further  shows that  the path  of the  dynamic process may also be 
insufficient to predict behavior if its velocity is not also taken into account. 
This is clearest in our model with experimentation and forgetting, whose 
predictions  approach  perfect  equilibrium  eventually  (e.g.,  by  t  = 
1,000,000)  for all  three games,  but whose rates  of change  become very 
low much earlier (e.g.  by t  =  100). It is the real (t =  10) or intermediate 
term (e.g. t =  100) predictions which correspond to the observed behavior, 
both when these predictions are close to the perfect equilibrium and when 
they are not (and both in the models whose intermediate term predictions 
are close to their long term predictions and those in which they are not). 
That  being the  case,  the  reasons  for our concern  with  real  time  and 
intermediate  term predictions (in contrast to asymptotic predictions) for 
both field and experimental data are worth restating. 
First, we believe that much of the economic phenomena we observe in 
the world is intermediate term in nature.  Although we have concentrated 
here on demonstrating this for a body of experimental data, it is not only 
in experiments that  long term behavior may be difficult to observe. For 
example, none of the annual labor markets and matching processes whose 
historical  evolution is  studied  in  Roth  (1984,  1990,  1991),  Mongell  and 
Roth  (1991),  and  Roth  and  Xing  (1994)  have  gone  for  more  than  fifty 
years--i.e.  50 iterations--without  a  change  of environment  substantial 
enough to mean that  the  same game was no longer being played.  After 
such a change the behavior of participants typically goes through a period 
of readjustments  as they adapt both to the new environment  and to the 
new strategies of other agents. 
Second,  even when we identify economic phenomena with  sufficient 
longevity  and  stationarity  so  that  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  they  are 
A recent monograph on adaptive algorithms (Benveniste et al.,  1990) devotes an extremely 
short section to the subject, which we quote in its entirety (Section  1.4.2,  The Transient 
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yielding long term behavior, there is reason to be cautious about the long 
term  behavior  of any  models  we  create.  This  is  because every model 
includes  some  elements  of the  situation  being  modeled  while  ignoring 
others.  And  when  the  learning  curve  becomes  flat,  there  is  room  for 
unmodeled factors to become important--factors  that may be present at 
every stage of the learning process, but are unimportant when the learning 
curve is steep. 
To extend the geological analogy used in the introduction,  erosion is 
not  the  only  force  that  acts  on  coastlines.  If we  can  expect  volcanic 
eruptions every millenium or two, then, if erosion is slow, this will change 
our predictions about whether all coastlines will be sandy beaches. And 
there are also gentle but steady forces such as sedimentation,  that work 
in the  opposite direction from erosion,  so that  when erosion is fast we 
may be able to neglect them, but when it is slow, they may cause coastlines 
to  rise  rather  than  fall.  So the  reasons  for devoting  more  attention  to 
intermediate term results are not only that we live and die in the intermedi- 
ate term and that changes in the environment (including the players) make 
data for the  very long term  hard  to gather,  but also that  we have  less 
reason to be confident in a particular model of learning when the learning 
curve is fiat than when it is steep. Our results here suggest, however, that 
such models may have considerable predictive power when the learning 
curve is steep. 
In conclusion, this paper reports an exercise in "low" (rationality) game 
theory. Low game theory differs from traditional,  "high" game theory in 
how the players are modeled: Where high game theory models the players 
as  hyperrational,  we have  modeled them  as  simple  adaptive  learners. 3° 
What  low  game  theory  has  in  common  with  high  game  theory,  which 
distinguishes both approaches from nongame-theoretic models, is the cen- 
tral place given to modeling the strategic environment,  i.e., to the game 
itself. But here too, there is room to consider the cognitive capacities of 
the players, since the full strategy sets in a repeated or multiperiod game 
quickly become large. Although the players in the experiments discussed 
here were engaged in multiperiod games, we have modeled their strategies 
by (discretized  subsets of) their  stage game strategies.  This  has proved 
to be sufficient, perhaps because they are not engaged in repeated games 
(i.e., against the same opponent). However, it is likely that future research 
in low game theory will have to, at least sometimes, pay close attention 
to what subsets of very large strategy sets are accessible to and employed 
by the players. 
3o Of course we have chosen one of very many possible ways to model less-than-complete 
rationality, and the question of what are the best ways will be empirical. (The equilibrium 
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Most  of the  theoretical  research  on  adaptive  models  has  focused  on 
finding conditions under which the adaptive models converge to equilib- 
rium as time goes to infinity. (Thus high game theory can sometimes arise 
from low game theory.) In contrast, we have argued that, when the object 
is to develop low game theory in directions useful for empirical economics, 
infinite time horizons  deserve to be treated with the  same skepticism as 
other  idealizations.  Nevertheless,  we  have  seen  (in  the  best  shot  and 
market games) that for some games the intermediate term predictions of 
low game theory correspond with those of high game theory. We conjec- 
ture that,  when  they coincide, the common  predictions of both kinds of 
game  theory  will quite generally prove to be robustly descriptive of ob- 
served behavior, as they were here.  For other games, like the ultimatum 
game,  the  predictions  of low  and  high  game  theory  diverge.  We  have 
shown here that (even) in such cases), the predictions of low game theory 
may be of independent interest, because they are descriptive of observed 
behavior. 
APPENDIX 
Data and Initial Propensities for the Ultimatum Game 
Simulations  by Countl~y 
Demand 
l  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Total 
Israel 
No of demands  0  0  0  l  22  17  7  6  7  60 
Player l's IP  0  0  0  0.02  0.37  0.28  0.12  0.10  0.12  1 
No. of rejections  0  2  1  3  3  5  14 
Rej. rate:  0  0.09  0.06  0.43  0.50  0.72 
Mon. correction  0.08  0.08 
Player 2's IP  0  0  0  0.08  0  0.35  0.07  0.22  0.28  1 
Japan 
No. of demands  4  0  2  3  20  13  7  4  5  58 
Player l's IP  0.07  0  0.03  0.05  0.34  0.22  0.12  0.07  0.09  1 
No. of rejections  0  --  0  2  2  4  4  3  3  18 
Rej. rate  0  0  0  0.67  0.10  0.31  0.57  0.75  0.60 
Mon.  correction  0.17  0.17  0.67  0.67 
Player 2's IP  0  0  0.17  0  0.14  0.26  0.10  0  0.33  1 
USA 
No. of demands  0  0  2  4  27  15  3  2  I  54 
Players I's IP  0  0  0.04  0.07  0.50  0.28  0.06  0.04  0.02  1 
No. of rejections  --  --  0  0  5  4  2  I  0 
Rej. rate  --  --  0  0.25  0.18  0.27  0.67  0.50  0 
Mon. correction  0.19  0.19  0.50  0.50  0.50 
Player 2's IP  0  0  0.19  0  0.08  0.23  0  0  0.50  1 APPENDIX--Continued 
Demand 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Total 
Slovenia 
No.  of demands  0  0  0  3  36  12  8  1  0  60 
Player  l's IP  0  0  0  0.05  0.60  0.20  0.13  0.02  0  1 
No. of rejections  0  7  2  4  1  -- 
Rej. rate  0  0.19  0.17  0.50  1  -- 
Mon. correction  0.19  0.19 
Player 2's IP  0  0  0  0.19  0  0.31  0.50  0  0  1 
Data and Initial  Propensities for the Best Shot Game: Number of 
Obseroations  in Each of the Simplified Game's Nine Contingencies  in 
the First Two Rounds 
Condition:  Full  Partial 
Quantity:  q2  q2 
0  •  2  4  Sum  0  2  4  Sum 
0  1.5  3  5  9.5  2  2  2  6 
ql  2  1.5  0.5  1  3  4.25  0.75  0  5 
4  3  0  0.5  3.5  5.75  0.75  0.5  7 
Sum  6  3.5  6.5  16  12  3.5  2.5  18 
Calculation of player  l's IP 
0  9.5/16  =  .59  6/18  =  .33 
2  3/16  =  .19  5/18  =  .28 
4  3.5/16  =  .22  7/18  =  .39 
Calculation of player 2's IP (a few examples) 
000  (1.5/9.5)(1.5/3)(3/3.5)  =  0.07 
002  (1.5/9.5)(1.5/3)(0/3.5)  =  0 
004  (1.5/9.5)(1.5/3)(0.5/3.5)  =  0.01 
020  (1.5/9.5)(0.5/3)(3/3.5)  =  0.02 
and so forth  ... 
(2/6)(4.25/5)(5.75/7)  =  0.23 
(2/6)(4.25/5)(0.75/7)  =  0.03 
(2/6)(4.25/5)(0.5/7)  =  0.02 
(2/6)(0.75/5)(5.75/7)  =  0.04 
The Market Game: Number of Bids in the First Two Rounds, 
by Country 
Bid 
0.25  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  9.75 
Country 
Israel  0  1  0  0  0  2  4  5  16  27  17 
Japan  1  1  0  0  1  4  4  10  19  24  8 
USA  0  4  I  2  2  14  6  6  14  14  l 
Slovenia  0  0  0  0  l  3  5  16  24  19  4 
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